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ABSTRACT: This paper uses the language of formal dialectics to explore how argumentation schemes and 
their critical questions can be characterized as an extension to traditional dialectical systems. The aim is to 
construct a dialectical system in which (i) the set of locutions is extended to include scheme-based moves 
(ii) the set of structural rules describes the roles that critical questioning can play; and (iii) the set of 
commitment rules distinguishes between exceptions and assumptions.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Argumentation schemes have been proving to be a powerful tool in understanding the 
structure of arguments as well as playing a key role in the pedagogy of critical thinking. 
One of the key features of schemes is the set of critical questions. Walton and others have 
started to explicate how these critical questions seem to be of two types: assumptions and 
exceptions. The way in which these two function in argumentative discourse is now just 
starting to be better understood, and a link with burden of proof is being established, 
particularly in the context of legal argumentation. The inherently dialogical nature of 
critical questions has to date, however, been rather down-played. This paper uses the 
language of formal dialectics to explore how argumentation schemes and their critical 
questions can be characterized as an extension to traditional dialectical systems. The aim 
is to construct a dialectical system in which (i) the set of locutions is extended to include 
supporting claims with arguments constructed from schemes, and responding to 
challenges by countering with such arguments; (ii) the set of structural rules describes the 
roles that critical questioning can play; and (iii) the set of commitment rules distinguishes 
between exceptions and assumptions. In this way the formal dialectic specification itself 
captures the way in which the different schemes license both proponent and opponent to 
use particular moves, and the different critical questions oblige and permit particular 
dialogical actions. 
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ARGUMENTATION SCHEMES 
 
Argumentation schemes are forms of inference from premises to a conclusion of the kind 
used in arguments used in everyday conversational exchanges in which one party is 
trying to get another to come to accept a conclusion that is at issue. They represent 
patterns of deductive and inductive reasoning in some instances, but typically they 
represent defeasible inferences of a kind that are useful heuristics for moving to a 
plausible hypothesis under conditions of uncertainty and lack of knowledge. Many of 
them are similar to the so-called topics of Aristotle, and, in the same way as topics were 
long taken to be, can be useful for inventing arguments as well as for evaluating them. In 
modern times, many of the most common and important schemes have been identified 
and analyzed by Hastings (1963), Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969), Kienpointner 
(1992), Walton (1996), and Grennan (1997). Recently there has been considerable 
interest in schemes in computer science, notably in artificial intelligence, where they are 
increasingly being recognized in fields like multi-agent systems as useful for making 
refining the reasoning capabilities of artificial agents (Reed and Norman, 2003; Verheij, 
2003). For special use in artificial intelligence systems Pollock’s OSCAR (1995) 
identified some ten schemes. 
Schemes are necessary for identifying arguments, finding missing premises, 
analyzing arguments, and finally for evaluating them. The tool used for evaluation is the 
set of appropriate critical questions matching each scheme (Hastings, 1964). The 
questions criticisms that, if not answered adequately, make the argument fitting the 
scheme fail to hold. The scheme most commonly used to illustrate how schemes work is 
the one for argument from expert opinion, as formulated in (Walton 1997, p. 210), here 
with some minor notational changes.1 E is an autonomous agent of a kind that can 
possess knowledge in some field or domain expertise, represented by the variable F. Such 
a domain of knowledge is assumed to contain a set of propositions (statements). 
 
Scheme for Argument from Expert Opinion  
 
Major Premise: Source E is an expert in field F containing proposition A. 
Minor Premise: E asserts that proposition A (in field F) is true (false). 
Conclusion: A may plausibly be taken to be true (false).  
 
Any argument fitting the scheme for argument from expert opinion is supposed to be 
evaluated in a dialogue framework in which another party (usually called the respondent) 
can ask critical questions. The standard six basic critical questions matching the appeal to 
expert opinion (Walton 1997, p. 223) are these.  
 
1. Expertise Question: How credible is E as an expert source? 
2. Field Question: Is E an expert in the field F that A is in? 
3. Opinion Question: What did E assert that implies A? 
4. Trustworthiness Question: Is E personally reliable as a source? 
5. Consistency Question: Is A consistent with what other experts assert? 
6. Backup Evidence Question: Is E’s assertion based on evidence? 
 
                                                 
1 An earlier version used the variable D to represent the domain of knowledge. 
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If the respondent asks one of the six critical questions a burden of proof shifts back to the 
proponent’s side to respond appropriately. Asking any one of the six questions defeats the 
argument temporarily until it has been answered. 
The method of evaluating an argument like one from expert opinion is dialectical. 
It is carried out by an assessment of such a shifting of burden of proof as a dialogue 
proceeds in a given case (Walton 1997). When the respondent poses any one of the six 
critical questions, the proponent has the burden of responding at the next move. The 
problem of evaluating the argument this reduces to the problem of tracking such a 
dialogue and deciding who has lost or won, given the moves they made, in the order they 
made them. However, there are differences between the critical questions on how 
strongly or weakly they produce such a shift. 
 
Critical Questions in Carneades 
 
Carneades approaches the problem of determining how the burden of proof should be 
distributed by dividing premises of a scheme into three types, ordinary premises, 
assumptions and exceptions (Gordon, Prakken and Walton, 2007). Evidence for ordinary 
premises and assumptions must be produced by the proponent of the argument with these 
premises, whereas evidence for exceptions must be produced by the respondent. The 
critical questions matching the scheme are represented in Carneades as assumptions and 
exceptions. The premises and conclusion of the scheme for argument from expert opinion 
are classified in the Carneades model as follows.  
 
Ordinary Premise: E is an expert in the subject domain S containing the 
proposition A. 
Ordinary Premise: E asserts A. 
Assumption: E is a credible expert. 
Exception: E is not reliable. 
Exception: A is not consistent with the testimony of other experts. 
Assumption: A is based on evidence. 
Conclusion: A. 
 
The distinction between assumptions and exceptions in Carneades tells us which answer 
to a critical question can be assumed, if the critical question has not been asked yet. 
Whether an assumption or exception is appropriate depends on the burden of proof in a 
dialogue. If the respondent who poses the question should have the burden of proof, the 
critical question should be classified as an exception. If the proponent should have the 
burden of proof, the critical question should be classified as an assumption.   
 
THE GAME ASD 
 
Our aim is to define an Argumentation Scheme Dialogue, or ASD. We take as our 
starting point Walton's (1984) game, CB. As a subset of Mackenzie's (1979) DC game 
and Hamblin's (1970) H, it is both familiar and simple. CB has just four locutions, five 
commitment rules and three further dialogue rules, and with such a small set, allows us to 
explore what is unique to dialogue with schemes. (We hope in future to apply scheme-
based extensions to much richer accounts of argumentative dialogue such as PPD 
(Walton and Krabbe 1995)). We do not here want to defend CB as a model of (even 
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idealised) dialogue – but rather use it as a tool to explore how a dialogue game can be 
extended to encompass argumentation schemes. 
 
Walton's CB is as defined as follows (Walton 1984, pp133-135): 
 
Locution Rules 
i. Statements: Statement letters, S, T, U, ..., are permissible locutions, and truth-
functional compounds of statement-letters. 
ii. Withdrawals: 'No commitment S' is the locution or withdrawal (retraction) of a 
statement. 
iii. Questions: The question 'S?' asks 'Is it the case that S is true?' 
iv. Challenges: The challenge 'Why S?' requests some statement that can serve as a 
basis in (a possibly defeasible) proof for S. 
 
Commitment Rules 
i. After a player makes a statement, S, it is included in his commitment-store. 
ii. After the withdrawal of S, the statement S is deleted from the speaker's 
commitment store. 
iii. 'Why S?' places S in the hearer's commitment-store unless it is already there or 
unless the hearer immediately retracts his commitment to S. 
iv. Every statement that is shown by the speaker to be an immediate consequence of 
statements that are commitments of the hearer then becomes a commitment of the 
hearer's and is included in his commitment store. 
v. No commitment may be withdrawn by the hearer that is shown by the speaker to 
be an immediate consequence of statements that are previous commitments of the 
hearer. 
 
Dialogue Rules 
R1. Each speaker takes his turn to move by advancing once locution at each turn. A 
no-commitment locution, however, may accompany a why-locution as one turn. 
R2. A question 'S?' must be followed by (i) a statement 'S', (ii) a statement 'Not-S', or 
(iii) 'No commitment S'). 
R3. 'Why S?' must be followed by (i) 'No commitment S' or (ii) some statement 'T', 
where S is a consequence of T. 
 
Walton goes on to describe further Strategic Rules that are not of interest here and are 
invariant to the extensions for argumentation schemes. 
Like Mackenzie, Walton requires his dialogue game to have available to it a set of 
rules of inference. In (Walton 1984), the assumption is that these are selected from the 
rules of inference of propositional logic, but here we relax that assumption and instead 
expand the set of rules to include argumentation schemes. Walton's (1984) definitions of 
immediate consequence and consequence hold for schemes just as they do for deductive 
rules of inference: 
 
immediate consequence. A statement T is an immediate 
consequence of a set of statements S0, S1, ... Sn if and only if 'S0, 
S1, ..., Sn therefore T' is a substitution-instance of some rule of 
the game. 
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consequence. A statement T is a consequence of a set of 
statements S0, S1, ... Sn if and only if T is derived by a finite 
number of immediate consequence steps from immediate 
consequences of S0, S1, ... Sn. 
 
(Walton 1984, pp. 132-3) 
 
The analogy between deductive and inductive reasoning is strong here: where deductively 
if we know A and A e B, then B is an immediate consequence (assuming Modus Ponens 
is amongst the rules of inference we accept); where inductively if we know E is an expert 
(in the domain of X) and E asserts X, then X is an immediate consequence (assuming 
Argument from Expert Opinion is amongst the rules of inference we accept). 
CB supports what we might call 'reasoning elicitation' (i.e. the support of a 
conclusion by a premise) along a single specific path: one player states S, the other player 
challenges, Why S?, and the original player can respond with T, of which S is a 
consequence. It is this reasoning elicitation step that is the focus of the extension of CB to 
form ASD. 
We introduce a new dialogue rule that is applicable after the S - Why S? - T 
pattern: 
 
(R4) After a statement T has been offered in response to a challenge locution, 
Why S?, then if (S, T) is a substitution instance A of some argumentation scheme 
of the game, the locution pose(C) is a legal move, where C is a critical question of 
scheme A appropriately instantiated. 
 
There are several things to note about rule R4. Firstly, CB does not deal explicitly with 
enthymemes. It is not particularly instructive to extend it to do so, but it is important to 
note that argumentation schemes have an arbitrary number of premises, and only some of 
these premises might be introduced explicitly in a dialogue. So (S, T) in rule R4 may be a 
partial substitution instance. We may, for example, say: 
 
My doctor has said I need to eat less salt, so I probably should try and cut down. 
 
This is an enthymeme in which the doctor's expertise in dietary matters is left implicit – 
we have one of the premises of the scheme, plus its conclusion: 
 
(Minor premise) My doctor has said I should eat less salt 
(Major premise) My doctor is an expert on my diet 
(Conclusion)  I should eat less salt 
 
The instantiation (My doctor has said I should eat less salt, I should eat less salt) thus 
counts as a partial substitution instance of the general form of the scheme, (E says A, E is 
an Expert, A), and would license a pose(C) moves under rule R4. 
The rule R4 introduces a new locution move, pose(C), which can be added as a 
fifth in the list of CB's locutions: 
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(v) Critical Attacks: the attack 'Pose C' poses the critical question C associated 
with an argumentation scheme. 
 
Though there is a single locution type, it has two distinct effects on the dialogue 
depending on whether the critical question being posed is an exception or a assumption. 
Broadly, we want to capture the intuition that assumptions are required for an argument 
to go through, that they function much like missing or implied premises, and that 
questioning them requires the proponent of the argument to justify. Exceptions, in 
contrast, are potential attacks in which the barrier is set higher: an interlocutor must not 
just ask the question but must provide some evidence for the potential counter. This 
distinction is discussed with legal examples in (Prakken et al., 2005) and with 
computational ramifications in (Gordon and Walton, 2006). We assume that the different 
types of critical questions are explicitly marked - both (Gordon and Walton 2006) and 
(Rahwan et al., 2007) suggest that this is a reasonable expectation in computational 
practice as well as in theory. We can then formulate a new dialogue rule to handle the 
Pose move: 
 
(R5) After a 'Pose C' move, then either 
 (a) if C is an assumption of its argumentation scheme, the move is followed by  
  (i)  a statement 'C' 
  (ii)  a statement 'not-C' 
  (iii) 'No commitment C' 
 (b) if C is an exception to its argumentation scheme, 
  (i)  a statement 'C' 
  (ii)  a statement 'not-C' 
  (iii) 'No commitment C' 
  (iv) 'Why not-C?' 
 
Part (a) of rule R5 is of course a rehearsal of the rule for the question move: questioning 
an assumption is analogous (as Gordon and Walton (2006) and Verheij (2005) have 
discussed) to questioning an implicit premise (in these earlier versions of the theory, what 
are now called assumptions were referred to as presumptions). Part (b) extends the 
permitted responses to include a reciprocal challenge move, requiring the other party to 
justify their critical questioning. 
So for example, an assumption of the expert opinion scheme is that E is indeed an 
expert in the right field (an assumption associated with the second critical question of that 
scheme). If this is questioned, the speaker must state that it is the case, or that it is not, or 
withdraw commitment to it. Similarly the fourth critical question of the expert opinion 
scheme allows a critic to probe the expert's reliability. The question that can be posed is 
'Is the expert reliable?', to which the proponent can respond with not only statement or 
withdrawal moves but also a challenge, 'Why is the expert not reliable?' 
But what happens if critical questions are not posed? Clearly, with respect to 
exceptions, there is nothing to do: only if an interlocutor takes exception is there any 
work to be done – exceptions function as potential “growth points” of an argument, but 
the opportunity for growth lapses if not taken up. But for assumptions, it seems natural to 
account for the assuming some how. This is an ideal candidate for the notion of mere 
concession introduced in Walton and Krabbe's (1995) PPD. Mere concessions provide a 
way of accounting for propositions that are agreed to (typically by a hearer) but in a 
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weaker way than commitments. Specifically, commitments are usually required to be 
defended on demand, whilst mere concessions are not. Unfortunately, CB does not have 
such a subcategory of commitment – so instead we sketch how bare commitment to 
assumptions can be introduced.  
 
(iv) Every statement that is shown by the speaker to be an immediate consequence 
of statements that are commitments of the hearer via some rule of inference or 
argumentation scheme A, then becomes a commitment of the hearer's, along with 
all the assumptions of A. 
 
This encompasses the previous version of this commitment rule because the definition 
encompasses rules of inference such as Modus Ponens which have no assumptions, as 
well as argumentation schemes which may have critical questions, some of which will be 
marked as assumptions. 
The new Pose move also introduces commitment directly but it does so in exactly 
the same way as the challenge move, so can be accommodated by a change to CB's third 
commitment rule: 
 
(iii) Both 'Why S?' and 'Pose S' place S in the hearer's commitment store unless it 
is already there or unless the hearer immediately retracts his commitment to S. 
 
In combination, these changes to the rules of commitment and the rules of dialogue 
ensure that inference over argumentation schemes can contribute to a dialogue in just the 
same way as inference over deductive rules, and furthermore that the burden of proof is 
distributed appropriately across the different critical questions: the proponent takes the 
burden of proof for assumptions, the questioner for exceptions. 
 
To summarise, our new dialectical game, ASD, is as follows: 
 
Locution Rules 
i. Statements: Statement letters, S, T, U, ..., are permissible locutions, and truth-
functional compounds of statement-letters. 
ii. Withdrawals: 'No commitment S' is the locution or withdrawal (retraction) of a 
statement. 
iii. Questions: The question 'S?' asks 'Is it the case that S is true?' 
iv. Challenges: The challenge 'Why S?' requests some statement that can serve as a 
basis in (a possibly defeasible) proof for S. 
v. Critical Attacks: the attack 'Pose C' poses the critical question C associated with 
an argumentation scheme. 
 
Commitment Rules 
i. After a player makes a statement, S, it is included in his commitment-store. 
ii. After the withdrawal of S, the statement S is deleted from the speaker's 
commitment store. 
iii. 'Why S?' places S in the hearer's commitment-store unless it is already there or 
unless the hearer immediately retracts his commitment to S. 
iv. Every statement that is shown by the speaker to be an immediate consequence of 
statements that are commitments of the hearer via some rule of inference or 
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argumentation scheme A, then becomes a commitment of the hearer's and is 
included in his commitment store along with all the assumptions of A. 
v. No commitment may be withdrawn by the hearer that is shown by the speaker to 
be an immediate consequence of statements that are previous commitments of the 
hearer. 
 
Dialogue Rules 
R1. Each speaker takes his turn to move by advancing once locution at each turn. A 
no-commitment locution, however, may accompany a why-locution as one turn. 
R2. A question 'S?' must be followed by (i) a statement 'S', (ii) a statement 'Not-S', or 
(iii) 'No commitment S'). 
R3. 'Why S?' must be followed by (i) 'No commitment S' or (ii) some statement 'T', 
where S is a consequence of T. 
R4. After a statement T has been offered in response to a challenge locution, Why S?, 
then if (S, T) is a substitution instance A of some argumentation scheme of the 
game, the locution pose(C) is a legal move, where C is a critical question of 
scheme A appropriately instantiated. 
R5. After a 'Pose C' move, then either 
 (a) if C is a assumption of its argumentation scheme, the move is followed by  
  (i)  a statement 'C' 
  (ii)  a statement 'not-C' 
  (iii) 'No commitment C' 
 (b) if C is an exception to its argumentation scheme, 
  (i)  a statement 'C' 
  (ii)  a statement 'not-C' 
  (iii) 'No commitment C' 
  (iv) 'Why not-C?' 
 
WORKED EXAMPLE 
 
As an example, let us take the following dialogue fragment between Bob and Wilma. 
Wilma isn’t sure about Bob’s assertion that the conference programme is perfect, and 
tries to convince Bob that it has a mistake in it. 
 
(L1) Bob: OSSA’s great; all the experts go. And they’re brilliant at doing the 
programme – they never make a mistake. 
(L2) Wilma: Hmm. Look at the programme: either Alf is staying at home, or 
they’ve made a mistake on this one. 
(L3) Bob: Yes, I suppose so. 
(L4) Wilma: Well do you remember that ‘expert’ piece that Alf wrote in South 
Western Ontario Philosophy Monthly that said that most Canadian philosophers 
go to OSSA? 
(L5) Bob: Yes, I remember. 
(L6) Wilma: Well Alf should know, so we can take it that most Canadian 
philosopher's do indeed go. 
(L7) Bob: Yes but he'd have a biased opinion. 
(L8) Wilma: Why do you think he's biased? 
(L9) Bob: Er, not sure – OK so what if he wasn't biased? So what? 
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(L10) Wilma: Well if we know that Canadian philosophers are going, then, given 
that Alf is a Canadian philosopher, he'll certainly be going. 
(L11) Bob: No, not necessarily – he only said most philosophers. 
(L12) Wilma: Well, you must agree that if all experts are going (as you said) and 
Alf is an expert (as you agreed), then Alf must be going any way. 
(L13) Bob: Yes, I suppose so. 
 
We can reconstruct the dialogue propositionally, tracking the changes to the commitment 
stores thus: 
 
Locution Speaker Content B's Commitments W's Commitments 
L1 B a, b a, b  
L2 W c w not-a ?   
L3 B c w not-a  c w not-a  
L4 W e ?   
L5 B e  e   
 
L6 
W d 
by AS1 that has e as 
premise, and f as an 
assumption and g as 
potential exception 
d, 
f 
d, 
f 
L7 B Pose(g)   
L8 W Why not-g   
L9 B g g  
L10 W e e not-c?   
L11 B No commitment e e not-c   
L12 W (f v b) e not-c ?   
L13 B (f v b) e not-c (f v b) e not-c 
not-a 
 
 
Key List 
a: They never make a mistake doing the programme at OSSA.  
b: All the experts go to OSSA. 
c: Alf is staying home 
d: Most Canadian philosophers go to OSSA 
e: Alf said most Canadian philosophers go to OSSA 
f: Alf is an expert 
g:Alf is unbiased 
 
 
At L13, Wilma wins – one can see how this is so with the following proof through Bob's 
commitments to Wilma's thesis TW: (we assume that all the rules of propositional logic 
are available to this dialogue; they are indicated in the proof by 'PL'): 
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(1)  (f v b) e not-c  (Established at L13) 
(2) b   (Established at L1) 
(3) f   (Established at L6) 
(4) f v b   (2, 3, PL) 
(5) not-c   (1, 4, PL) 
(6) c w not-a  (Established at L3) 
(7) not-a   (5, 6, PL) ■ 
 
The trick to Wilma's success is in using the assumption implicit in the argumentation 
scheme at L6 to formulate the final implication at L12, having failed with the implicative 
gambit (or “corner” in the language of (Walton 1984)) of L10. In more detail, the game 
starts with Bob offering his position which commits him to two propositions (and, indeed, 
several others omitted here for clarity). In order to try and have Bob retract his 
commitment to a (that they never make a mistake in the conference programme), Wilma 
adopts a strategy based on disjunctive syllogism, pointing out that (in the face of some 
evidence), either Alf isn't going (c), or else a mistake has been made (not-a). At L3 Bob 
accepts the disjunction, so Wilma proceeds to disprove the first disjunct. She starts by 
introducing the claim that Alf wrote an article saying that most Canadian philosophers 
attend OSSA (e). At L5, Bob agrees to this claim. At L6 Wilma uses an argumentation 
scheme (we assume it is rather like the Scheme from Expert Opinion presented in the first 
section) based on the premise e, and with the conclusion d, that most Canadian 
philosophers do indeed attend OSSA. The use of this scheme involves an assumption – 
that Alf is an expert (f), which gets tacitly added as another commitment under 
commitment rule (iv). The scheme also has a potential exception – that the expert may be 
biased – here referred to as g. (Note that the scheme carries a number of other 
assumptions and exceptions omitted from this analysis for clarity). Bob decides to pose 
the critical question associated with this exception – not because he has any particular 
reason to doubt the honesty of the expert, but rather, as a strategic ploy, in an attempt to 
shift the burden of proof to Wilma (Prakken et al., 2005). Unfortunately for Bob, at L8, 
Wilma rejects the ploy by demanding justification for the critical question, as she is 
permitted to do with critical questions associated with exceptions, under locution rule 
(R5b). With no further evidence, Bob is compelled to concede that his question has no 
further justification, so agrees that the exception does not hold (g). At L10, Wilma 
attempts to win her “corner” - the premise that will guarantee success, namely the 
conditional that if most Canadian philosophers are going, then Alf is going. Bob rejects 
this conditional though. So at L12, Wilma adopts a different strategy, this time using the 
implicit assumption from the argumentation scheme used earlier at L6. She again aims 
for agreement on a conditional, this time that if Alf is an expert, and all experts are 
attending OSSA, then Alf is attending OSSA. This time, Bob agrees, so Wilma wins her 
corner – she has one of the disjuncts in her disjunctive syllogism shown to be false, so the 
other – her ultimate thesis – must be true. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper has aimed to sketch how traditional dialogue games can be extended to take 
account of the dialectical nature of argumentation schemes. Most work on argumentation 
schemes to date, both within argumentation theory, and also in artificial intelligence 
where such schemes have found a very warm reception, has focused on the 
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representational and inferential aspects. Yet schemes clearly have an inherently 
dialectical nature, with critical questions forming a crucial component. By showing how 
schemes can fit in to simple, well-established dialogue games, it becomes possible, first, 
to develop more sophisticated games that exploit what argumentation schemes can do 
with an eye to implementation in artificial intelligence, and second, to explore 
theoretically the links between argumentation schemes and fallacies, for which dialogue 
games were largely invented. 
 
link to commentary
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